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The  request  of  the  Internet  users  enjoying  privacy  during  their  e-activities  enforces  the  Internet  society  to  
develop techniques which offer privacy to the Internet users, known as Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs).  
Among the Internet users, there are attackers who desire more than anything else to enjoy privacy during their 
malicious actions, and a PET is what they were looking for.  Thus, although a PET should offer privacy to the  
internet users, proper techniques should also be employed in order to help the victims during the investigation  
procedure and unveil the identification of the attackers. The paper summarizes the current design issues of PETs  
and introduces additional issues in order to offer forensic investigation services. To the best of our knowledge  
this  is  the  first  attempt  which  it  proves  (the  obvious)  that  the  existing  PETs  do  not  meet  accountability  
requirements. By knowing explicitly the reasons the PETs are inefficient offering accountability, it is the most  






























































This  section describes  how the PET protocols  approach  the  issues  below,  which are currently  under PETs’ 
consideration. The PET should be able to:
a. forward the message to the Server as quickly as possible
An Anonymous User (AU) wants to enjoy the anonymity offered by the PET without sacrificing the performance 
of   the   communication.  However,   the   use   of   cryptography,  which   is   used   by   the  most   PETs,   reduces   the 
communication’s performance.
TOR offers  a  circuit­based communication.  Before  a  user  sends   information   to a  Server,  a  circuit  must  be 

























































The Crowds and the Anonymizer support  only limited protocols of  the 7th OSI Layer,  including the HTTP 
protocol.
f. be adapted easily
A user, who wants to use a PET without the need of modifying the existed system infrastructure or Operating 
System, is more likely to use it. The distribution of software which should offer integrity is not an easy task. In 














































If   the  x   is  equal   to   the  encryptedMessage,   then  the  unencrypted  message  of   the   encryptedMessage   is   the 
plainMessage;   therefore,   the  PET knows   that   the  plainMessage  has  been   forwarded  by   itself,  without   any 
signature on this specific message.









b. Can a PET decide if a packet is malicious or not?
The  PET  must   adopt   a  mechanism  capable   to  detect  whether   a  message   is  malicious   or   not.   In  order   to 
accomplish that, the message must be decrypted.
The current  PETs do not  attempt   to  offer   forensics   investigation  services;   therefore,  none of   the  PETs has 
employed such a mechanism. Furthermore, the incorporation of this service in the PETs does not lead to privacy 
violation or any other kind of threat.



















d. Can a PET identify the sender of a message even with a compromised intermediate PEE?
In the case of a single­proxy PET, a compromised PEE leads to catastrophic results, not only for the forensic 
investigation procedure but also for the privacy violation of all the users using that PET.







identification  of  a  user,   even with  an   intermediate  compromised  PEE.  The only condition   is   that   the  PEE 









































Can a PET know that a message 
was sent by itself?
NO NO NO
Can a PET decide if a packet is 
malicious or not?
NO NO NO
Can a PET identify the sender 
(Anonymous User) of a message?
M L L
Can a PET identify the sender of 
a message even with a 
compromised intermediate PEE?
NO L N/A
Can a PET provide evidence to 
the Server about the involvement 
of a user?
NO NO NO
Can a PET provide a guarantee to 
the Server that the PET will co-
operate in the investigation?
NO NO NO
Level of achievement: 
H= high      M=medium   L=low    NO= not offered 
N/A=not applicable
CONCLUSION
Based on the current PETs’ design considerations, it is an issue the fact that the PETs offer privacy to the users 
without any design consideration to discourage attackers to attack through PETs. Thus, PETs’ design goal should 
also include/suggest a proper way to prevent the potential attackers to use maliciously these technologies. 
The lack of advanced authentication techniques and non­repudiation actions of the client gives the potential 
attackers the opportunity to use the PETs and take advantage of these technologies. Besides, an Internet user 
should have privacy as far as he/she does not violate the rights of others. If, at the end of the day, we (internet 
society) have the perfect PET based on the current criteria, which does not prevent or discourage an attacker to 
attack through this technology, we will have bigger problems to solve, like the e­anarchy.
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